FINAL CONTEXTUAL ESSAY

 

essayFinaldraft

 

In the early part of WW2. The Wehrmacht was an unstoppable force. In terms of how long it took for the respective powers to capitulate after the invasions of their heartlands were launched. Norway, benefitting from its geographic distance from Germany held out for two months. France, the second most powerful nation at the time, withstood Germany for a month and a half. Poland lasted a mere thirty- fiveafter a laughable six hours of ‘combat’. Because nobody likes being occupied by a foreign power (unless you are from New Caledonia (Deutsche Welle)). The methods by which the Nazi Party brought about this seemingly unstoppable advance of the German Army into Europe have been the subject of much study. Many amateur historians and neckbeard wehraboos that play way too much Warthunder believe they have an answer; The superiority of German tanks and airplanes.

Upon closer examination, neither tanks nor airplanes can explain this victory. French Tanks were technically superior compared to their German counterparts, being faster, better armed, and armored, and weren’t drastically outnumbered by the Germans. The British likewise to a lesser extent regarding tanks. With respect to the technological superiority of German planes being the driving factor, the wehraboos do have a better argument given the Allied powers’ air forces were definitively inferior numerically and technologically (Encyclopædia Britannica, A). But one can’t forget that tanks and planes can do nothing save looking cool in a storage lot. A Biplane where the pilot is armed with a bottle of whiskey and an AR15 would defeat an unmanned F-22 every single time. It’s not the equipment that counts, it is how the equipment is used to reach its full potential that counts. Therefore, we can that see that it is not necessarily the advanced equipment of the German Army that caused the victory in 1940.

So, if tanks and airplanes didn’t cause the German victory in 1940, what did? Two factors were arguably the most important, the existing doctrine of the German Army and the prevalent usage of the radio as a tool for communication. Firstly, we will discuss the doctrine that the Germans had done in the war.

The kind of people who would be interested enough in World War Two to read this paper to begin with are likely familiar with the term blitzkrieg, a German word that translates as lightning war. To nail down the definition of Blitzkrieg, it is a paradigm of warfare that seeks to use highly concentrated and fast-moving military formations to break through the enemy lines, encircle them from the penetrated rear, and then liquidate the enemy with slower-moving infantry. Yet, Blitzkrieg is not German doctrine. (In fact the term ‘Blitzkrieg’ is from the Western journalists describing the German way of war (Fanning, p302)). Instead, the term is a manifestation of the results of actual German doctrine in action. These being, the laissez-faire bottom-up command structure, emphasis on maneuver warfare, and the discouragement of what the Germans called ‘one-sidedness.’

In chapter 3, verse 17 of the Art of War, Sun Tzu writes that “He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.” Master Sun is affirming the civilian government shouldn’t micro-manage military matters. German doctrines take this ancient doctrine to a new level. Affirming that even the commanders themselves should avoid micro-managing the army. As we read Robert Citino in the Journal for Strategic Studies “The Germans also found over the years that conducting an operational-level war of movement required a flexible system of command that left a great deal of initiative in the hands of lower-ranking commanders. It is customary today to call it Auftragstaktik (mission tactics):

The higher commander devised a general mission (Auftrag) and then left the means of achieving it to the officer on the spot. It is more accurate, however, to speak, as the Germans themselves did, of the “ʺindependence of the lower commander”ʺ (Selbständigkeit der Unterführer)” (Citino, p7,A). This Selbständigkeit der Unterführer doctrine gives a massive advantage to the subscribing army. This is because of the simple reality that no matter how skilled the ranking officer is he can only be in one place at once time. The commander can’t exploit fleeting opportunities and enemies’ mistakes if he isn’t there to witness them. However, the high degree of independence afforded to junior officers enables them to take the initiative of a senior officer and take advantage of those fleeting opportunities.

Moreover, it is hardly like the idea of Selbständigkeit der Unterführer was a recent innovation in the German Army by the 1930s. Clinto again reports that such tactics were in used in the German Wars of Unification as early as a century before the outbreak of WW2 (Clinto, p330, B).

The second doctrine existing before the outbreak of the Second World War was the emphasis on maneuver warfare. “Bewegungskrieg the war of movement. It was a way of war that stressed maneuver on the operational level not simply tactical maneuverability or a faster march rate, but the movement of large units like divisions, corps, and armies.” (Clinto,p7,A) Think encircling, flanking, surrounding, geographically dividing, and penetrating the enemy’s rear that’s what she said, cutting off routes of resupply, retreat, or reinforcements. Or put in another way, The German doctrine of Bewegungskrieg would assert that it is infinitely better to have the army hastily march through the night through some unforgiving back mountain road and get into the position to encircle the enemy, rather than to fight and destroy the enemy. Again, as with the case of the doctrine of Auftragstaktik, the doctrine of

Bewegungskrieg was nothing new in the German Army. It is reported again by Citino in (pg 331, B), that the ideas of Bewegungskrieg had been recognized and practiced as early as the Days of Fredrick the Great of Prussia.

And thirdly, the doctrine of ‘anti-one-sidedness’. This doctrine is awkwardly named because it is not a doctrine per se, rather is a name for attitude within the intellectuals of the German army that denounced overreliance on any one discrete. Paraphrasing from (Clinto, pg 331,B), we learn that the same intellectuals of the German Army prided themselves on avoiding overly simplistic thinking that declared this tactic, technology, or way of thinking would be the silver bullet that would utterly crush the Allies.

What this meant in practice was that. (And this is going to upset the History Channel and their constant documentaries on the German Wunderwaffe). Anybody attempting argue that Germany can be brought to victory completely on the back of a tank or completely on the back airplane would be dismissed as an idiot. These are the three doctrines that the German army had going into the war. Now let us discuss the German attitude towards the radio.

The Radio is, of course, a device that can be used to deliver practically instantaneous long- distance communication. Given that radio waves travel at the speed of light, radio communication is literally the fastest possible mode of communication. This is common knowledge and I hardly need to cite authority on this subject. However, there is a plethora of information to cite regarding German attitude towards the Radio.

In short, they had a very welcoming attitude towards the Radio. This quotation from Clinto sums it up best, “radio was the real breakthrough of the period. The days of the runner, the unreliable telegraph

and Mrse code were over, replaced by direct voice messages from the commander to subordinate and vice versa……………….. Although the British were the first to make tactical use of them in their tanks, the Germans

had a better grasp of the operational possibilities.” (Clinto, p.332, B) Indeed, not is not difficult to see just to how significant a degree the Germans used the Radio. Each division was given its own unique radio company (www.hgkampe.homepage.t-online.de, Rw.-Nachr.Truppe) and entire prewar exercises were

devoted simply to accessing the ability of radio companies to communicate vital information to friendly divisions (Clinto, pg332, B). Even formations as small as infantry companies had their dedicated ‘radio guy’ to help disseminate information.

In addition to infantry, the German love Affair with radio communication can be seen especially in tanks. General Heinz Guardian is commonly credited as essentially the architect of German armored forces. He was the general that originally envisioned of Germany possessing army division composed of primary of tanks and of them being the spearhead of said army (Encyclopædia Britannica, B). With that introduction in mind, Guardian foresaw the need for radio systems in tanks long before the war began. He wrote extensively on the subject in his papers he outlined the need for the panzer division to be armed with radio sets in much the same as the infantry was being outfitted. He envisioned each tank having its own radio set, able to communicate with all tanks in the formation. With one tank being reserved as a ‘command tank’ with the added ability to communicate with the High Command. (Mengal p. 4-5)

Nowwe have established the doctrines of Auftragstaktik, Bewegungskrieg, and of one-sidedness.

Moreover established the German military’s fascination and implementation of the radio. How do these things advance my thesis that the same brought about a practically overnight German victory? By themselves, they do not. The Doctrines I’ve discussed have been around for give or take a century, yet the performance of Nazi Germany blows Prussia and the Kaiserriech out of the water. And the Radio is just

that, a radio. So, what’s the deal? I argue that when the radio is used in conjunction with the German Doctrine, the result is a perfect storm, catapulting the effectiveness of the German army to titanic heights.

 

 

 

Consider the downsides of Auftragstaktik for a moment. Although Auftragstaktik gives the subscribing army the ability to rapidly take advantage of fleeting opportunities, it also generates opportunities for junior officers to make fools of themselves at best, and to lose thousands of men to a grave strategic blunder at worst. These concerns are hardly theoretical, as they have been discussed by German military planners for decades (Clinto, pg.8, A). To give just one example, consider General Eduard von Flies during the Prussian-Austrian war, who decided it would be a good idea to frontally assault an entrenched enemy position that had twice his manpower.

 

 

 

In addition, consider likewise the inherent downsides of Bewegungskrieg. When a formation travels away from the base, communication, resupply, and reinforcements obviously become significantly harder, and that’s just considering pure logistics. In combat, it is easy to conclude that venturing away from the base to gain a positional advantage (something that Bewegungskrieg demands) could just as easily lead to your downfall. For instance, attempting to encircle the enemy could lead to yourself getting encircled if the enveloping thrusts get cut off from the main source. Attempting to flank could get yourself flanked if your sides aren’t covered, and on and on.

 

 

 

These inherent disadvantages with both doctrines simply no longer exist in the context of radio communication technology. Starting with Auftragstaktik first. Because the radio enables instantaneous communication, the Junior officer about to take the fleeting opportunity can. One, instantly consults surrounding units and scouts for the presence of potential traps and pitfalls. And two; Instantly

 

communicate his plans to the High Command, who can then instantly take back control from the Junior Officer if he is making a mistake.

 

 

 

Regarding Bewegungskrieg, radio communications allow instant access to the entire intelligence apparatus of the Military. Specifically, it allows the junior officer to have access to the live locations of every single friendly formation, and the last known location of every single hostile formation. Pre-radio, the entire danger of leaving the main base of operations to do fast maneuver warfare was the risk that you could end up surrounded and cut off by enemy forces. That danger simply doesn’t exist if you know the location of friends and enemies at all times -To encircle the enemy just pick the path where you avoid him and just walk around him.

 

 

 

This of course begs the question, if the German way of war is awesome why didn’t Poles, Brits, and French pickup their own radio sets and recreate it? For two reasons. Firstly, it is because they generally distrusted the radio as a tool for communication. During my research, I was able to find quite of bit of material on the German use of the radio. For the other two powers, what little I’ve come up with demonstrates a clear pattern of disdain. In (Radio Telegraphy) we clearly that the French outright shunned the radio. Believing that radio signals are too liable to be intercepted. The British, although not completely shunning the radio (as far as I know) had significant problems with critical military innovation in the interwar period. (Alphons, pg 255)

 

 

 

So, to summarize, The usage of radio as a tool for military communication, considering the already existing doctrine of the German Military. Allow the Nazi leadership to easily overpower

 

Germany’s neighbors. And that the lack of French and British military innovation in this area made them unable to utilize the radio to its fullest potential.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Citino, Robert. “Beyond fire and movement: Command, control and information in the German blitzkrieg

.” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 2004, pp. 324–344, https://doi.org/10.1080/0140239042000255940.

 

Citino, Robert. “The War Hitler Won The Battle for Europe, 1939-1941.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies , vol. 14, no. 1, 2011, pp. 1–18. Fall 2011.

 

“Forces and Resources of the European Combatants, 1939.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II/Forces-and-resources-of-the-European- combatants-1939. Accessed 9 Nov. 2023.

 

Fanning, William J. “The origin of the term ‘blitzkrieg’: Another view.” The Journal of Military History, vol. 61, no. 2, 1997, p. 283-302, https://doi.org/10.2307/2953968.

 

“Heinz Guderian.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 10 Nov. 2023, www.britannica.com/biography/Heinz-Guderian.

 

Leo, Ducheine Paul Alphons. “12.” Cyber Warfare Critical Perspectives, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2012, pp. 255–255.

 

matWare. Das Militrische Fernmeldewesen in Deutschland, www.hgkampe.homepage.t-online.de/.

Accessed 4 Dec. 2023.

 

Mengel, John W. “An Analysis of the Operational Leadership of General Heinz Guderian.” DTIC, Defense Technical Information Center , 13 Feb. 1998, apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA348618.

 

“New Caledonia Votes ‘no’ to Independence – DW – 10/04/2020.” Dw.Com, Deutsche Welle, 4 Oct.

2020, www.dw.com/en/new-caledonia-rejects-independence-from-france/a-55152260.

 

“Radio Telegraphy.” 1940. Transmissions in the Maginot Line Radio: Use in 1940, maginot.org, www.maginot.org/trans/tr16-002_gb.htm#header-. Accessed 9 Nov. 2023.