Forthcoming chapter on integrative constructivism in The Wiley handbook of personal construct psychology:
Personal construct psychologists have historically had an uneasy relationship with constructivism. Some have objected to it on philosophical grounds, arguing that George Kelly’s (1955, 1991a, 1991b) personalconstruct psychology (PCP) is best viewed as a critical realist, not constructivist, approach (Noaparast, 1995; Stevens, 1998; Warren, 1998). Others have worried that constructivism has the potential to overshadow PCP, placing the latter in a precarious position (Fransella, 1995, 2007). Others still have argued that constructivism is broad and ill-defined—or, at the very least, is less theoretically and methodologically developed than PCP (Fransella, 1995; Winter, 2014). These concerns arise in part because constructivism and its precise relationship to PCP typically go unspecified. To remedy this, I present four premises of an integrative constructivism and address how PCP—in conjunction with other forms of constructivism—both fits within it and contributes to it. My goal is to offer a meta-framework that lets PCP maintain its own integrity as a theoretical unity, while also offering a set of shared premises that permit PCP’s inclusion under a superordinate integrative constructivist banner.
Raskin, J. D. (2016). Personal construct psychology in relation to an integrative constructivism. In D. A. Winter & N. Reed (Eds.), The Wiley handbook of personal construct psychology (pp. 34-44). London, England: Wiley-Blackwell.